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BOOK REVIEWS
Legal Control of the Press. By Frank Thayer.

Chicago: The Foun-

dation Press. 1944. Pp. vii, 608. $4.50.
Professor Thayer has written what must have been conceived primarily as a textbook for journalism students and a handbook for prac-

ticing newspapermen.

Lawyers should find it an informative and au-

thoritative accession to their libraries. Assuredly, editors and publishers will find it invaluable.
Every newspaper editor worthy of his hire must be something of a
lawyer. He must have a fairly adequate knowledge of the legal controls that apply to the press. In the course of each day's work, he
must make many decisions involving the legal accountability of his
paper. The very urgency of time under which the modem newspaper
is produced prevents leisurely consultation of the publisher's attorney
on any save the most difficult issues. The editor must act quickly and
surely, and if his decision is faulty, his company may find itself involved in a troublesome, even disastrous, lawsuit. It must be mournfully recorded that many solvent newspapers have been financially
wrecked by heavy judgments obtained against them because their editors did not reckon wisely with the terrors of the libel law.
Professor Thayer is singularly qualified for the difficult task which
he has undertaken. A member of the Chicago bar, he is a specialist in
newspaper law. For many years, he has lectured on press law to the
journalism classes of the University of Wisconsin. Before he became
lawyer and professor, he was employed on the editorial staff of several
metropolitan newspapers. He has a talent for clear and convincing
expression for which his journalistic experience must be partly responsible. Above all, he possesses an intimate, workaday knowledge of
newspaper problems and practices which makes his exhaustive and informed discussion of legal questions extremely practical.
The legal status of the American newspaper is highly paradoxical.
The press is the only business whose basic freedom is singled out for
special warranty in the Constitution of the United States and of each
of the forty-eight states. But this liberty is not absolute. It is severely
qualified by the responsibility to which the newspaper is held for the
truthful and unprejudiced exercise of its freedom.
Most of the state constitutions make clear the conditional character
of the liberty guaranteed to the press. The language of the North
Carolina Constitution is perhaps typical: "The freedom of the press is
one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought never to be
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restrained, but every individual shall be held responsible for the abuse
of the same."'
The most effective restraint on press abuse is, of course, the accountability of the individual newspaper for any libel which it may
commit against an individual or a business or an institution. The
newspaper is free only to report the truth or to indulge in fair comment
on matters that are appropriate subjects of published discussion. The
law very properly demands that malice shall not enter into reporting
or editorial-writing.
Virtually, one-half of the space in Professor Thayer's volume is
-devoted to a discussion of the law of libel in all of its ramifications and
implications. Such emphasis does not exaggerate the libel law as a
discipline of the press or as a protection of the individual against irresponsible, prejudiced journalism.
Professor Thayer's treatment of the libel law is, by all odds, the
most satisfactory which has come to this reviewer's attention. It appears to cover every important libel issue which has been raised and
adjudicated in this country. Not the least of its merits is the fact that
it is strictly up-to-date, reporting the most recent cases.
Libel suits in the United States are definitely diminishing. For this
happy circumstance, many factors are responsible, but the newspapers
are justified in taking some of the credit to themselves. They have
improved their manners and methods during the past forty years. Yellow journalism which was willing to play fast and loose with the reputations of individuals to create a sensation is virtually extinct in this
country. Gone is the editorial swashbuckler who felt that he could
advance his own convictions only by writing at the top of his voice.
Reporting is vastly more objective. The modem newspaper rarely
regards itself as a political organ which must hurl billingsgate for the
glory of its party.
But the libel hazards are so real that they still prey on the thoughts
of the conscientious and cautious editor. He knows that the chances
of unwitting error are so great that despite the utmost care he may draw
litigation on his paper's head. Many of the states have libel statutes
that afford every reasonable protection to innocent journalistic mistakes.
Furthermore, American courts usually extend to defendant newspapers
all of the consideration to which they are entitled under a socially wise
interpretation of press freedom. For all that, there are still libel suits
resulting in heavy costs to the American press.
Newspaper editors and publishers who wish to minimize the libel
risks can do no better than read carefully and understandingly Professor
Thayer's LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PREss. This work points the way
IN. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §20.
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from trouble. Newspaper attorneys who are intent on keeping their
clients out of libel litigation will find his treatment of the subject
astonishingly complete andl exceedingly useful. Lawyers will be particularly pleased by the generous citations of important cases.
There are, of course, other legal controls to which the American
press is subject. There are the copyright laws. There is the much
vexed question of contempt. Professor Thayer handles all of these
controls with erudition and clarity. Particularly interesting is his recital of the long struggle which culminated in the freedom which the
press of the United States and of Great Britain now enjoys. It is a
spirited story which can stand much recounting. Certainly, it loses
nothing of its interest from Professor Thayer's graphic narration.
Although LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PIRss is textbookish in character,
it is not a primer written for those who do not know the meaning of
legal terms. The author has assumed that his readers-even the incipient editors-have some understanding of legal phraseology and has
wasted no space in explaining technical words. For this reason, lawyers need not shy away from the volume. This reviewer is no lawyer
but he has read virtually every standard work on press law. In our
unprofessional opinion, Professor Thayer has written certainly the most
modern and understandable and perhaps the most atithoritative work
on newspaper law.
D. HIDEN RAMSEy
Asheville Citizen-Times
Asheville, N. C.
Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws. By Samuel
B. Horovitz. Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1944. Pp.
xxxii, 486. $6.00.
The writer who contemplates a handbook on workmen's compensation faces a disheartening prospect. The difficulty arises from the
necessity of coping with subject matter which rests entirely on legislative foundations. Due to many striking dissimilarities on fundamentals
in the various state compensation statutes the writer on the subject
finds himself in a dilemma. He must either confine his text to a discourse on common factors or plunge into a morass of legislative cross
purposes. There can be no happy middle ground. With full appreciation of this handicap Mr. Horovitz has delivered himself of a text
which is commendable within its limited sphere of usefulness.
The author seeks to combine a fairly comprehensive survey of the
decisions of courts and administrative bodies with an admittedly liberal
critique of present &iayadministration of workmen's compensation. Obvious limitations of space make the book inferior to Schneider's ex-
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haustive treatise on the law,' and an unfortunately biased perspective
tends to impair its usefulness as a critical study. This is not to say
that the book is without substantial merit, but simply that it suffers
badly when compared with more ambitious and better things in the
2
field.
Part I is devoted to the history, theory and growth of workmen's
compensation acts in conjunction with an excellent discussion of federal
supremacy in five workmen's compensation problems. This latter is
perhaps the high spot in the book and constitutes its best claim as an
original contribution. The eighteen pages devoted to admiralty problems contain material which is not easily found elsewhere, although one
is tempted to doubt whether the detailed consideration of this subject
is warranted in the light of the spare treatment which is accorded many
more elementary topics.
One common characteristic of all compensation acts is a legislative
purpose to define and limit the operative boundaries of workmen's
compensation. These restrictions are drawn along several lines. Limitations as to the types of business to be affected are often imposed, and
these have given rise to much litigation in those states where they exist.
The distinctions between hazardous and non-hazardous businesses and
employments are seldom adequately drawn by the courts. Nor is it
often clear whether the nature of the employer's business or the employment of the workman at the time of the injury shall control. Yet
because of diversity of state policies on such matters, the author has been
content to accord these problems only scant recognition.8 At the same
time he devotes more than a hundred pages (the whole of Part II) to
the ambiguous phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment. Conceding that these problems are difficult and important, yet
the great disparity in treatment can hardly be so accounted for.
The material on the concepts "arising out of" and "within the scope
of" employment is voluminous and well organized. The breakdown
is both appropriate and helpful. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere in
the book, the crusader's zeal tends to overshadow the dispassion of the
scholar, and even those readers of liberal predisposition will observe a
lack of sound perspective. The author's quixotic eagerness to measure
swords with an unholy alliance which is supposed to bind courts to industrialists detracts much from the serious import of what he has to
' SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1939.-1944)
(12 vols., 7 now in
print).
'Notably the Schneider text, and DODD,ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COM2'ENSATION (1936).
The topic of non-hazardous employments is dealt with in a seven line para:graph (p. 187). The entire subject of the employer-employee relationship, in-cluding the respective rights and liabilities of independent contractors and their
-employers, agricultural labor, public employees, and casual employees, is allotted
a little more than fifty pages.
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say. Similarly, his refusal to acknowledge an honest conflict of interests
prevents his bringing the problems involved into sharp focus.
It will not be denied that in the incipiency of the movement for
workmen's compensation most employers were opposed- to the new
paternalism, which they feared would prove to be very expensive. However, the experience in those states which were tardy in adopting compensation measures has usually served to convince the most skeptical
members.of the employers' group of their misapprehension. The old
employer defenses either dlisappeared or were emasculatd by the courts,
and the purses of industrialists were generously opened by sympathetic
juries. 4 It was not long before these bad men scampered for the modest
shelter of compensation acts with their sharp limitations on the amounts
of recovery and their comparative freedom from the tender ministrations of juries. The growing industrialist class in Mississippi has persistently sought to convert the legislature of that state to the compensation principle, though as yet without success; and the reviewer is informed that pressure from the same source was largely responsible for
the recent workmen's compensation act of Arkansas. There is little
reason to believe that any subsequent efforts to restrict the operation of
the compensation principle have met with much success. Continuous
legislative expansion of the compass of the acts seems to refute any
such notion. The source of much obstruction to the progress of compensation must be laid at the doorstep of the attorney, whose professional interest is threatened by the simplified procedure and the fee
restrictions which are characteristic of progressive compensation acts.
But this wing of the opposition has largely escaped the author's aggression.
Part IV deals with important provisions common to all compensation laws. Here again, differences among the various acts make impossible anything but a superficial treatment. But the material here
is well assembled and is useful for purposes of comparison and for a
study of trends. This leads comfortably to the last division on administration and the future of compensation. The respective merits
of court and administrative tribunal operations and the relationship between these two bodies come in for their fair share of attention. The
author's observations and suggestions on. administration are, to this
Teviewer, sound and constructive. A short bibliography and an adequate index are provided, although there is no table of cases.
WEX S.

MALONE

Law School
Louisiana State University
The unfolding of the situation in Mississippi is described in Comments (1939)

12 Miss. L. J. 237-252, 454-464.
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Questioned Document Problems. By Albert S. Osborn. Revised and
edited by Albert D. Osborn. Albany: Boyd Printing Company.
1944. Pp. 546. $6.00.
"Dot handwriting is the worstest thing against me," said Bruno
Richard Hauptmann to the lawyer he was seeking to employ for his
appeal after he was convicted of kidnaping and murdering the child
of Colonel Lindbergh, then an American idol. And behind that statement lies a story.
Enough newsprint was devoted to that famous case to have gone
a long way in solving the present paper shortage. But perhaps our
national curiosity, frequently described as morbid, sometimes has a
beneficial effect. As a direct result of the publicity given the Lindbergh case, (1) the Federal kidnaping law, usually referred to as the
Lindbergh law, was enacted, and (2) a new profession was born.
Albert S. Osborn and Albert D. Osborn, author and editor, respectively of QUESTIONED DOcUMENT PROBLEMS, had charge of the handwriting investigation in the Lindbergh case, and the American public
first became conscious of the work of questioned documents examiners
in general, and of Albert S. Osborn in particular in that case.
Although "hand-writing experts" had been practicing their trade in
the courtroom for a number of years, and writing books on the subject
of hand-writing comparisons almost since hieroglyphic days, the average
citizen had only a scanty notion of the ways in which they went about
their work and of the fact that lives and fortunes were almost daily
being won and lost on the testimony of these experts. And, although
the work of Albert S. Osborn was of sufficient merit to warrant Dean
John H. Wigmore's writing the introduction to Osborn's monumental
work, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS, in 1910, which is credited with first
bringing scientific method and the possibilities of convincing demonstration in the field of questioned documents to the attention of the
legal profession and the judiciary, his name did not become a household
word until those long, weary days of the Hauptmann trial.
Until 1854 the English practice forbade the introduction of independent standards of comparison in handwriting cases, either for witness or jury use. Only if another sample of the questioned writing were
incidentally in the case (a writing introduced for some other purpose)
did the decisions allow comparisons between the sample and the questioned writing. Obviously, this completely prevented comparisons or
allowed only . risky comparison with one or two standards, usually of
a different date and type of writing and very effectively ham-strung the
scientific handwriting witness.
This practice was changed in England by statute in 1854. The
American practice had followed the English in excluding the standards;
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but, as has been the case in many instances, the reform did not follow
through immediately. According to Mr. Osborn, it took the persistent
and determined efforts of distinguished law-writers, particularly Professor Wigmore, over a period of years to trace the history of this practice, along with certain other unwarranted prejudices concerning handwriting testimony, and bridge the hiatus, opening the way for the scientific handling of problems in questioned writings in America.
As the way opened for the expert to bring to the witness stand his
findings and the reasoning and techniques he had used to arrive at
those findings, Mr. Osborn and a few other pioneers in this field were
working out and perfecting the techniques and methods of approach in
dealing with questioned documents; they were making an exact science
of what had hitherto been mainly superficial guesswork. They devised
special instruments, measures, test plates, comparison microscopes, and
chemical processes for testing ink, paper, and age of documents. The
invention and universal adoption of the typewriter opened entirely new
lines of document investigation for them. Osborn followed his QuEsTIONED DOCUMENTS with PROBLEMS OF PROOF in 1927 and a second
edition of QUEsTioNED DOCUMENTS in 1929.
His present book is intended as a supplement to QUESTIONED DocuMENTS, conforming more to the idea of a desk manual than a weighty
reference volume. The main purpose of the book is to assist the trial
attorney and the document expert in discovering the facts in cases involving questioned documents and proving these fcts in court. It can
be of service to any person interested in questioned documents, whether
or not he intends to pursue the matter to a conclusion in court-for
example, the documents examiner for an insurance company or merely
the interested layman.
Pursuant to this purpose, QUESTIONED DOCUMENT PROBLEMS presents the steps that the attorney and the expert should take in a questioned document case, whether it involve a will, a note, a contract, or
an extortion threat. Tests and instruments to be used on writings, a
list of the infinite information that a bit of typing can reveal to the
expert, questions to be asked the documents expert on direct and on
cross examination to bring out a case or test an opponent's case, citations to outstanding decisions in the field of questioned documents,
problems to be worked out to acquire familiarity with documents work
-these and a variety of other practical directions and suggestions are
available to the lawyer, the expert, or the layman.
Not strictly pursuant to that stated purpose, but apparently justifiable in view of the qualifications of the author, who seems to be something of a Dr. Johnson of the court room, the book presents the reflections and observations of Albert S. Osborn on the "law in action" as he
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has seen it during his many years as an expert witness in the courts of
a majority of the states and some foreign countries. Mr. Osborn decries
the jury system, particularly as it affects documents cases, attacking
most stringently the prohibitions against comment on the evidence by
the judge. He pleads for "Arbitration Boards," and makes potent
argument for the reference of many more cases than now receive that
treatment.
Perhaps the strongest appeal that Mr. Osborn makes-to lawyer,
documents examiner, judge, doctor or day laborer-is to keep studying,
keep training. He preaches the sort of self-training that Benjamin
Franklin and Abraham Lincoln, perhaps more than any other Americans, put to best use. Osborn himself is a fair example of what such
continued training can accomplish. Dean Roscoe Pound, in his introduction to the book, credits Mr. Osborn with creating the profession of
examiner of questioned documents; in 1938, Colby College, of Waterville, Maine, conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Science.
It cannot be said that Mr. Osborn has a happy gift with the pen.

Better composition would improve his work. And QUESTIONED DocuMENT PROBLEMS suffers from a lack of organization. Many of the
chapters are reprints from professional periodicals or papers delivered
at professional meetings, and the beads are not always well strung.
CLIFFORD PACE

Assistant Director
Institute of Government
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
The Task of Law. By Roscoe Pound. Lancaster, Pa.: Franklin and
Marshall College. 1944. Pp. 94. $1.50.
This book is the publication of the North Lectures delivered by
Dean Roscoe Pound at Franklin and Marshall College, in the year 1941.
The three lectures are entitled "Why Law?", "What Is Law?", and
"What May Be Done Through Law?"
In dealing with the first question, Dean Pound observes that the
history of civilization has been a gradual movement toward a systematic
application of the force of politically organized society through a scientifically organized body of authoritative guides to and grounds of decision developed and applied by an authoritative technique. The cause
for the effect is the incompatibility of justice without law and human
psychology. He lists as objections to justice without rule, the human
repugnance to subjection to the arbitrary will of others; the impracticability of harmonizing and compromising the conflicting and overlapping
human desires and demands; and the demand of the economic order
for certainty, uniformity and stability in the administration of justice.

19451

BOOK REVIEWS

Because aggressive self-assertion is potential in every man, it runs
counter to the social instinct of the individual. "The task of social
control and hence of the highly specialized form of social control which
we call law, is to control the individual tendency to aggressive selfassertion to satisfy individual desires," says Dean Pound. The desires
and demands of man to have or use things and to do things exist whenever he comes in contact with others. The legal order has the task of
determining which of the &lesiresand demands are -to be recognized and
secured, and to what extent, so that there shall be a minimum of friction
and waste.
Dean Pound says that four ideas must be kept in mind: Justice,
force, security, and balance. Justice must be administered by an impartial authority. Force must be an instrument of justice and not something which can justify itself. "The general security is historically the
first social interest to be recognized and secured by law." And security
depends upon balance.
In his second lecture, "What Is Law?", Dean Pound says that it
is a term of many meanings, including the laws of physical and natural
sciences, the laws of the social sciences, as well as the lawyer's idea of
law. He traces the development of law from its beginnings when its
aim was to restrain private war and preserve order, through kinorganized society and religious organizations of society, to the developed
society of today. He explains principles as authoritative starting points,
precepts defining legal conceptions, and precepts establishing standards.
There is a comparison of the conception of law by the analytical jurist,
who conceived of law as an authoritative pronouncement of the lawmaking organ of a politically organized society; the historical jurist,
who conceived of a law as a formulation of experience; and the philosophical jurist, who conceived of a law as an expression of reason.- Dean
Pound says:
"It is only laws which can meet the test of reason which endure. It
is only pronouncements of reason founded on or tested by experience
which become permanent parts of the law. Experience is developed by
reason and reason is tested by experience. Nothing else maintains itself in the legal system. Law is experience organized and developed by
reason, authoritatively promulgated by the lawmaking or law-declaring
organs of a politically organized society and backed by the force of that
society."
"What May Be Done Through Law ?" The expansion of our economic order' and the increasing problems of organized society have continuously called for more laws, resulting in multitudes of statutes, administrative regulations, and decisions. "Out of this condition," says Dean
Pound, "has grown a serious problem of enforcement." There is no
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better or more effective way to review this lecture than to quote the
concise and brilliant statements of Dean Pound.
"We come to see that the exigencies of the general security and of the
individual life require us to prescribe many things the reason for which
are not upon the surface and the justice of which, clear as it may be to
the expert, will not appear at once to every reasonable and conscientious
citizen.
"Hence we have to deal with the subject of enforcement in new ways.
We have to look into the limits of effective legal action. We have to
determine what we may expect to do through and what we must leave
to other agencies of social control.
"After the legal order has recognized and delimited certain interests
which it seeks to secure and has conferred or recognized certain rights,
powers, liberties, and privileges as means of securing them, it has now
to provide means of making those rights, powers, liberties, and privileges
effective. The means which the legal order employs for that purpose
are punishment, i.e., penalty to prevent by deterrence, specific redress,
substituted redress, and prevention.
"Three important limitations of law as an agency of soial control
have to be borne in mind in determining what interests the legal order
may secure and how it may secure them. These limitations grow out
of (1) the necessity which the law is under, as a practical matter, of
dealing only with acts, of dealing with the outside, not the inside, of men
and things; (2) the limitations inherent in the legal sanctions-the
limitations upon coercion of the human will by force; and (3) the necessity which the law is under of relying upon some external agency
to put its machinery in motion, since legal precepts do not enforce themselves."
For effective enforcement of a legal precept it must be backed by
social-psychological efficiency and power. Dean Pound says that there
are two sorts of law-making which are futile-one which has behind it
nothing but the sovereign imperative, and the other which is intended
to "educate," to set up an ideal of what men ought to do instead of imposing a rule as to what they shall do.
We must not allow our faith in the efficacy of effort to blind us to
the limitations upon the efficacy of conscious effort in shaping the law
so as to do the whole work of social control.
This book is what might be expected from one of Dean Pound's
superior learning and outstanding ability. It should be read and studied
by every lawyer who loves his profession and who recognizes the myriad
problems of legal philosophy.
LUTHER

Member of the North Carolina Bar
Concord, North Carolina.

T. HARTSELL,

JR.
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Cartels: Challenge to a Free World. By Wendell Berge.
ton. Public Affairs Press. 1944. Pp. vi, 266. $3.25.

Washing-

The Sherman Act empowered the Justice Department "to direct"
the district attorneys of the United States to institute proceedings in
order to prevent and restrain violations of the act. For many years,
it has been assumed that this "directing" power implies discretion on
the part of the Justice Department to prosecute or not to prosecute and
to choose between civil and criminal proceedings. Such an interpretation has been applied not only to the Sherman Act but to all antitrust
acts. Because of this discretion, the vague text of the Sherman Act,
and, last not least, the fluctuating judicial interpretations of the antitrust acts, it is of capital importance to learn how the executive power
looks upon business coalitions of private entrepreneurs.
The author of the volume reviewed here is an outstanding expert
in the cartel field and also the executive officer in charge of administration of the antitrust acts. This gives particular significance to Mr.
Berge's book. It not only discusses evils legally prohibited (mala quia
prohibita) but also expresses the author's opinion as to what is an evil
apart from positive legal prohibitions (mala per se).
In his preface, Mr. Berge touches upon the core of cartel discussions
when he says that it is a simple matter "merely to make assertions
about the evil effects of cartels." He rightly recognizes that useful
generalizations can be made only on the basis of a "fairly detailed explanation of the operation of particular cartels." That is why he cites
extensive case material from antitrust proceedings pertaining to medicines, synthetic hormones, vitamins, quebracho extract, titanium, optical
instruments and miscellaneous products. The author also takes into
account the results of the investigations of the Temporary National
Economic Committee. It is a matter of opinion whether this factual
material may be regarded as sufficient fundament to make all-embracing
conclusions about the future operation of marketing control organizations of private entrepreneurs. I believe that the material assembled is
enough to conclude that there is danger that private economic power
may be abused, and has been abused in certain respects. A much more
comprehensive empirical investigation, however, would be necessary to
ascertain whether marketing cooperation among private enterprises on
the international scale is almost always socially undesirable. Mr. Berge
is not responsible for the very unsatisfactory status of economic research
in the field of international trade. As a matter of fact, the Justice Department and Congressional investigating committees (and parliamentary agencies in other countries) have been instrumental in conducting
marketing research which should have been the primary task of professional economic research agencies. There is a great difference be-
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tween marketing research as carried on by the Justice Department and
Congressional investigating committees on the one hand and that performed by agencies on the other, whose professional task should be to
assemble empirical material about the international markets of all significant commodities and services. The difference is the following:
the Justice Department and congressional investigating committees are,
of course, principally attracted to commodities and marketing situations
which are significant because of a particular political situation, or because of actual abuses of economic power. Whereas agencies in charge
of general investigation of markets should investigate all significant
markets and services on international markets, whether abuses have
occurred or not. On certain problems, such as patents, trademarks,
and secret technological processes, indeed, general conclusions can be
drawn on the basis of the material available. Furthermore, there is
little doubt that the available empirical material is sufficient to consider
measures against German methods of economic penetration. Many
people working in this field, however, are reluctant to form general
conclusions concerning all problems surrounding marketing cooperation
among private entrepreneurs in international markets before acquiring
a larger mass of case material related to many more significant commodities and services.
The necessity of complete suppression and prevention of German
economic warfare, cartelized and uncartelized, is self-evident. So is
the responsibility of a large class of German entrepreneurs for their
open or tacit approval of these methods of transacting business. This
aspect of the cartel problem, although immensely important, does not
answer the principal question whether conditions could be created which
would foster patterns of international marketing leading to socially desirable results. If I am not mistaken, Mr. Berge assumes that the
absence of cartel agreements probably would ensure active competition.
He furthermore assumes, if my impression is right, that the rational
self-interest of entrepreneurs induces them to compete actively. As far
as the interpretation of the law is concerned, Mr. Berge's position is
almost unassailable. As far as future public policy is concerned, a few
crucial problems need to be clarified.
First, the compulsory absence of cartel agreements on international
markets may result in non-competitive situations which may be even
more oppressive than open cartel relationships. The prohibition of
combination "agreements" and the enforcement of such prohibitions is
a difficult but not impossible task of legal technique. The problem of
commanding and enforcing active competition is, however, an unexplored item of legal and political research. The enforcement of active
competition in democratic governmental frameworks would require
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mechanisms never yet envisaged in public policies. To consider this
problem with reference to international markets would require bold
assumptions about the intimacy of international political cooperation of
the major industrial nations. Second, it may be questioned whether
the rational self-interest of entrepreneurs motivates as a rule for active
competition. Adam Smith expressed considerable scepticism in this
respect. "The interest of the lealers, . . . in any particular branch of
trade or manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and
even opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers." Although
this proposition of Adam Smith is considerably over-simplified, one may
rightly ask whether the entrepreneur should be required to compete
actively on international markets in order to further the public interest,
if (in his opinion) not to compete would serve his private interest.
Third, the available alternatives to private cartellization are .not always
(a) active competition, (b) intergovernmental marketing controls.
Available alternatives should be investigated from case to case, from
market situation to market situation.
One of the main propositions of Mr. Berge's study is that publicity
as to the existence of international cartels and as to their marketing
practices will in itself prevent many abuses. No serious student would
deny or qualify that proposition. Neither could it be denied that private
market organizations must not engage in practices which carry political
implications. Furthermore, no sound national or international regime
could tolerate private marketing organizations whose operation results
(or could result) in undesirable restrictions of the volume of production,
trade or in blocking technological progress.
The author is right that it is not a justification for advocating entrepreneurial cooperation "that we must join hands with cartels if we are
to engage in foreign trade." Such a formalistic justification by-passes
the essence of the issue. However, serious investigation might be directed toward ascertaining under what conditions cooperation of private entrepreneurs in those international markets in which workable
competition is improbable, might serve a balanced expansion of production and consumption.
An adequate review of Mr. Wendell Berge's thought-provoking
study would require considerably more space. His book, indeed, is an
excellent and well-timed contribution to research on future forms of
economic intercourse. The professional jurist, economist, political scientist, statesman and man in the street, whether or not he agrees with
all his views, will read his pungent arguments with profit and delight.
EPVIN HEXNER

The University of North Carolina

